could only be successful after a serious and bloody-conflict.

Captain Fox of the navy proposed a scheme for throwing provisions, and perhaps troops, into the fort. It was not expected that more than temporary relief to the garrison could be effected in this way; but it was thought possible, and, in fact, probable, that as much as this could be done.

It did not take long to satisfy the President that an expedition to Charleston Harbor organized on a scale sufficient to overcome the enemy's works and place Fort Sumter permanently out of danger, was utterly out of the question. The troops could not be had.

This question then came up,—Should the Government adopt Fox's plan, and endeavor to afford Anderson temporary relief ? Was it worth while for this object to run the almost certain chance that the relieving force, or Fort Sumter itself, or both, would be attacked by the South Carolinians and a civil war begun ? Would it not be better on every ground, now that a really satisfactory military solution of the question had been shown to be impossible, to order Anderson to evacuate the post and leave Charleston Harbor ?

It is not likely that the President came immedi-

ately to a decision on this most important subject. He laid the matter, as we have seen, before his Cabinet, and we have in writing the responses, given at two different dates, of the members of the administration. On the 15th of March, when the question was first presented to them and it was made plain